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Abstract
Cryptographic key exchange is considered to be a challenging problem in
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) operating in deep space environments. The
difficulties and challenges are attributed to the peculiarities and constraints of
the harsh communication conditions DTNs typically operate in, rather than
the actual features of the underlying key management cryptographic protocols
and solutions. In this paper we propose a framework for evaluation of key ex-
change protocols in a DTN setting. Our contribution is twofold as the proposed
framework can be used as a decision making tool for automated evaluation of
various communication scenarios with regards to routing decisions and as part
of a method for protocol evaluation in DTNs.
Keywords: delay tolerant networks, protocol evaluation, opportunistic key
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1. Introduction
Delay or disruption tolerant networks (DTNs) have increasingly become pop-
ular due to certain advantages over traditional protocols such as TCP/IP. DTNs
are store-and-forward networks and can be applied in various connectivity-
“challenged” networks such as deep space networks, under-water networks, ve-
hicular networks, sensor networks, mobile ad-hoc networks and so forth, where
bandwidth is limited and an end-to-end path from source to destination is not al-
ways available. Although DTNs by nature may support high availability (which
in DTN terminology is referred to as reliability), they are not short of security
issues.
Over the past few years, cyber attacks have grown constantly emphasizing
the need and importance of information security within a network. Security is
one of the major issues in deep space networks not only for military, govern-
mental, and commercial missions but also for scientific projects. Cryptographic
key exchange and cryptographic key management in general is considered to
be a challenging problem in DTN environments. Although there is a wealth of
key management protocols in the literature, there is no practical mechanism to
evaluate which protocol is more efficient in an environment with limited connec-
tivity and bandwidth. Throughout the literature the emphasis and priorities in
cryptographic protocol analysis were placed on the security goals rather than
the quality of service and the applicability and feasibility of such protocols.
Albeit the evolution, maturity and existence of rigorous and formal tools for
assessing the security properties of the plethora of security protocols, many of
them may be impractical in a DTN environment. As such, the purpose of this
paper is to propose a framework for evaluating key agreement protocols in terms
of delay and bandwidth constraints. From our simulation results we will also
show the impact of the missing credentials (e.g. certificate or session key) on
the end-to-end delay of space DTNs. The novelty of this work lies on the area
of cryptographic key management in DTNs which is an open and challenging
task.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the
literature review and the current state of the art for key management in DTNs.
In Section 3 a framework to evaluate cryptographic protocols in such networks
is proposed and in Section 4 simulation results are presented. In Section 5 a
discussion on opportunistic key management as an idea to minimize end-to-end
delay is introduced. Finally, we conclude the paper with Section 6 where open
issues, research challenges and future work directions are summarized.
2. Related work and current state of the art
The literature has a relatively long lasting and mature domain of key man-
agement. A significant amount of work is published on key management proto-
cols, most of which have been extensively analyzed, with well recognized security
properties and acknowledged weaknesses. However when it comes to integrat-
ing such protocols in a DTN infrastructure, it seems that the requirements and
constraints of a DTN environment render such protocols unsuitable. As such,
the prohibiting factors relate to the practical communication, performance and
efficiency aspects rather than the security capabilities of the key management
protocols. Most of the work done until now is based on the assumption of
shared key material [1]. In [2] the author states a series of requirements for
key management in DTNs without proposing a solution. Up to date a limited
number of approaches for key management in DTN environments can be found
in the literature, yet no method for automated practical evaluation of key es-
tablishment has been proposed. In fact in RFC6257 [3] and in the Internet draft
[4] key management is recognized as a difficult topic and the authors explicitly
state that such exclusion is a result of an informed decision. Last but not least,
the relatively new Internet draft proposes and outlines a design for security key
management in DTNs [5]. Specifically, the core requirements and design criteria
for DTN security key management are described.
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2.1. Key management in DTNs
Identity-Based Cryptography (IBC) has been examined as a potential so-
lution for security within DTNs. IBC is a cryptographic method that enables
message encryption and signature verification using the public identifier of an
entity. The authors in [6] propose an Hierarchical Identity Based Cryptography
(HIBC) that provides efficient and practical solutions to secure channels, mutual
authentication and revocations in DTNs. In addition, the authors in [7] evaluate
IBC cryptography in the context of a DTN. In [8] an anonymous authentication
protocol is presented and a secure communication solution based on the non-
interactive Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara (SOK) key agreement scheme is proposed.
This scheme is based on Boneh-Franklin hierarchical identity based encryption
(IBC) and signature schemes. However, such IBC solutions appeared to super-
ficially solve the problem [2]. Specifically, IBC solutions are undesirable due to
intractability of some problems such as Private Key Generation (PKG) param-
eter distribution, private key revocation, identity name space management and
so forth [9].
In [10] a group-oriented security solution for DTN that provides access con-
trol and secure group communications is proposed. The authors suggest a cen-
tralized group key management mechanism of the logical key hierarchy (LKH).
Group key management in DTN has been studied in [11]. The proposed pro-
tocol is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. The key lifetime concept is
also introduced in order to alleviate the forward security problem in many-to-
many DTN communication scenarios. Another work on group key management
is found in [12] where an automatic group key management scheme based on
one-encryption-key multi-decryption-key (OMPK) key protocol for DTNs is pro-
posed. In this work the authors also prove forward and backward security of
their protocol.
The author in [13] presents a key distribution scheme for infrastructureless
networks, which is based on the Bundle Protocol (BP) and more specifically
on the Bundle Security Protocol (BSP). With this dynamic and non-interactive
scheme, cryptographic keys for all the BSP mechanisms can be established. The
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derived keys will be used by the BSP supported algorithms such as HMAC-
SHA1 for authentication, RSA for digital signatures, and AES for encryption.
However, this work is also based on IBC which has proved to be impractical for
DTNs. The authors in [14] propose a dynamic virtual digraph (DVD) model for
public key distribution. They heuristically define the DVD model by extending
traditional graph theory. A public key distribution for pocket DTN based on
two-channel cryptography is also presented. The authors in [15] propose a one-
pass key establishment protocol based on an adoption of the Horsters-Michels-
Petersen (HMP) protocol. In their method they inject protocol messages in the
payload of the BP as part of the message. In addition, an encryption decision
making workflow diagram of a custodian node is developed.
More recently, the work in [16] focuses on the problem of key management
in the framework of content-based forwarding and opportunistic networks. A
specific key management scheme that enables the bootstrapping of local topol-
ogy is also proposed. In [17] the authors propose an authentication and key
agreement protocol with anonymity based on combined public keys for DTNs.
In their solution an on-line third trusted party is not required. In [9] the authors
propose a non-interactive key establishment scheme for BSP. Their work focuses
on space DTNs. They utilize a time-evolving mode based on the periodic and
predetermined behavior patterns of space DTNs. From the model, they can
schedule when and to whom a node should send his public key.
2.2. Key establishment evaluation
Selecting a suitable key management architecture from a large number of
candidate protocols to satisfy a variety of communication scenarios is a chal-
lenging task making an automated evaluation method highly desirable. Authors
in [18] proposed an evaluation index for a number of existing key management
schemes using qualitative analysis. However, such proposals have limited value
unless they take node replication attacks and robustness into consideration [19].
The authors in [19] employ Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) in order to se-
lect a suitable trustworthy key management scheme for wireless sensor networks
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(WSN). They also state that the selection of a suitable key management scheme
from a large number of existing schemes is not an easy issue. Six performance
criteria are considered for the selection: scalability, key connectivity, resilience,
storage overhead, processing overhead and communication overhead. All the
aforementioned studies for protocol evaluation are based either on qualitative
analysis or on the study of possible attacks. In DTNs and specifically in deep
space environments where bandwidth is a scarce resource a framework for auto-
mated protocol evaluation is necessary. This framework for protocol evaluation
can apply in various DTN networks and scenarios. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first framework which takes into consideration node credentials (eg.
access to session keys or certificates) and DTN network topology and evaluates
the protocol based on the overhead imposed by the exchanged messages.
3. The Framework
The basic idea of our framework is to evaluate protocols and specifically
key exchange protocols automatically. A protocol parser has been created for
analyzing both cryptographic and environment delays in order to export a ns-2
script. The main focus of this study is to examine end-to-end delay consider-
ing various cryptographic delays. More specific, cryptographic message length,
number of passes and network topology are analysed to produce end-to-end de-
lay. The protocol parser has been implemented in python and can be used as a
decision making tool through the evaluation of alternative communication paths
and scenarios. As an input we use three representation languages, the proto-
col language (protocol messages), the node language (node credentials) and the
path language (end-to-end paths with bandwidth information). From the pro-
tocol and node language we can extract the cryptographic delays while from
the path language we can extract the transmission delay. We also made the as-
sumption that the propagation and processing delay are constants with a fixed
value (typical values for deep-space networks) as an input. However, the pro-
cessing delay is negligible compared to transmission delay in such networks. In
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addition, in this work, inter-meeting time between nodes is not considered, due
to a priori-known and predetermined connection time in deep-space DTNs. The
aforementioned procedure is depicted in Fig.1. The parser also checks whether
the protocol can be completed by the participating nodes prior to exporting the
ns-2 script. The checks are performed for each of the participating nodes and
establish whether the underlying node is capable of performing the respective
protocol step - that is, whether it has the required knowledge of the protocol
parameters. In the case of failing to pass the check, the parser recommends in-
jection of further protocols to generate or obtain the missing parameters. Due
to the lack of regular and timely communication in DTNs, security credentials
could be missing or expired. As such, timely access to security credentials may
not always be possible. In addition, due to the lack of connectivity, nodes may
not have the opportunity to establish session keys. In cases of limited or no
opportunities to obtain security credentials in advance, nodes can retrieve them
afterwards resulting to a considerable increase in end-to-end delays as yielded
by the parser, due to the message injection process (see Scenario 4). Naturally,
such protocol injection could add a considerable amount of delay or overhead
to the communication, which will be recorded by the ns-2 simulation.
Protocol Language. In the protocol language we use a symbolic model and de-
scribe the protocol by constructing a transcript of the exchanged messages. The
usage of a symbolic model is suitable for automation [20]. Table 2 summarizes
all the supported functions and a usage example. All the functions calculate
and return the length (in bytes) of the cryptographic operation. To create the
desirable message we can combine the supported functions in a row or even as
an input for another function. The syntax requires that source and destination
nodes are specified on the left side of the message. For instance, a simple nonce
message between nodes A and B is represented as “A→B:nonce(4)”, where 4 is
a typical length in bytes of a nonce message.
Node Language. In the node language we map the appropriate cryptographic
parameters to nodes, namely symmetric key, private key, public key and certifi-
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cate. In Table 3 we summarize the usage of the node language. For example
if both nodes have the symmetric key K we can represented as “A:symkey=K”
and “B:symkey=K”.
Path Language. Last but not least we have the path language, where routing
end-to-end paths are inserted. The path must correspond to the following pat-
tern:
Source Node[Downlink,Uplink]Middle Node[Downlink,Uplink]Destination Node.
A usage example could be A[0.1Mb,0.0002Mb]B, where A is the source node,
B is the destination, the downlink bandwidth (from A to B) is 0.1 Mbps and
the uplink bandwidth (from B to A) is 0.0002 Mbps.
For the implementation of the aforementioned parsing languages we use py-
parsing [21], which is python library for creating grammars. Apart from the
input languages the protocol parser contains a library with a variety of key
agreement protocols.
One other characteristic of the protocol parser is message or protocol injec-
tion that may be required as mentioned earlier. A usage example of the injection
could be the following scenario. Assume that node A (security-source) wishes
to exchange encrypted information with node B (security-destination) by using
the AES algorithm. However, only node B has access to the symmetric key.
The parser will automatically inject the appropriate messages between node A
and a trusted node who serve as a Key Distribution Center (KDC), in order to
have access to the appropriate credential. The exported tcl script will contain
all the necessary communication for a successful scenario completion.
4. Simulation Results
Following the execution of a specific scenario by the parser, the exported
tcl scripts can be fed to ns-2. More specifically, the simulations can be run on
the DTN agent for ns-2 [22]. Modifications have been made in order to support
two-pass communication and interactive communication protocols.
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For the simulations we used TCP as the convergence layer, with a propaga-
tion delay of 10 min (which is a typical value for a deep space DTN scenario [23])
and a maximum bundle fragmentation size of 30 KB. We assume the following
deep-space scenarios where all the available paths can accurately be predicted.
The first two scenarios presented are trivial, and are used for creating a bench-
mark and for drawing conclusions on the delay overheads due to lack of access
to security credentials and generally due to the number of protocol passes in
deep-space networks. The rest of the scenarios are based on real deep-space
scenarios, where data needed to be sent to ground earth station [23].
4.1. Scenario 1
In this scenario node A (security-source) wishes to establish a session key
with node B (security-destination) by using an adoption of HMP protocol [15].
HMP is a one-pass key agreement protocol. To adopt HMP, protocol messages
are injected in the payload of the Bundle Protocol (BP). We selected this pro-
tocol for simulation due to low communication cost by design. The downlink
between A and B is 0.05 Mbps and the uplink between B and A is 0.0001 Mbps.
We will compare two alternatives of the protocol: i) both nodes have all the nec-
essary credentials and ii) the sender (node A) does not have access to receiver’s
(node B) public key.
In the first case only one protocol message (one-pass) is needed for a suc-
cessful scenario completion. However in the second scenario two more messages
must be exchanged prior to the protocol message: one message that asks for the
public key from the Certificate Authority (CA) and one reply message from the
CA to node A that contains the public key. Fig. 2 shows the first case, where
both nodes have access to public key and the second case after the message
injection.
From the simulation results (see Table 1), we note the significance of a node
to have access to all the appropriate credentials. As we can see end-to-end delay
is almost three times greater in the scenario where key establishment is needed.
One approach for addressing delays due to the unavailability of credentials is
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the idea of opportunistic key exchange that is introduced in the next section.
4.2. Scenario 2
In this scenario, node A (security-source) wishes to establish a session key
with node B (security-destination) and both nodes have access to all the nec-
essary credentials. The proposed framework is used to compare a selection
of one-pass key authenticated key agreement protocols. More specifically, we
evaluated some of the existing key exchange schemes the Key Exchange Al-
gorithm (KEA), the Unified Model (UM), the Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV),
the Station-to-Station (STS) and the adapted HMP protocol. The first three
algorithms have the same exchanged messages (two-pass) and only the key cal-
culation in the node changes. STS is a three-pass protocol, whereas the HMP
based protocol is one-pass protocol.
From the protocol comparison (see Table 1) we can see the difference amongst
the one-pass, two-pass and three-pass protocols. From the results it can be seen
that one-pass key exchange protocols can be highly preferred in deep space
scenarios due to their performance.
4.3. Scenario 3
In this scenario, we assume rover A (security-source) wants to send 1 KB
of sensitive data to the ground station E (security-destination). There are two
available paths: i) source A to satellite D to destination E and ii) source A to
satellite B to satellite C to destination E. In the first path the middle node D
is untrusted and confidentiality is a security requirement that must be fulfilled,
whereas in the second path all nodes are trusted. In addition source node A
(rover) does not have the session key and he must require it from a neighbor
node which serves as a KDC.
The question is to identify which case is more efficient in terms of delay.
Fig. 3 depicts the topology with all the possible routes from rover to ground
station. In Table 4 we can see the input parameters of the protocol parser for
both cases.
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From the simulation results (see Table 1) we can conclude that it is more
desirable to select the longer path because node A does not have the session
key K. If the session key had been retrieved from KDC before it was needed,
the path with the fewer hops would be preferable. Again opportunistic key
management could suppress such a problem by the exchange of session keys for
future usage.
4.4. Scenario 4
In this scenario, we assume rover A (security-source) wants to send 10 MB of
sensitive data to the ground station B (security-destination). Node A (security
source) has access to node’s B (security destination) public key but they do not
have a symmetric session key established. We compare three different cases.
In the first case we encrypt the data with RSA (asymmetric encryption) and
there is no need to establish a session key. In the second and third case we first
establish a session key and then the data are encrypted with AES (symmetric
encryption). Both algorithms (RSA and AES) are supported by the BSP pro-
tocol. In addition, in the second case we use the adoption of HMP protocol [15]
(one-pass) for key establishment whereas in the third case we use the STS pro-
tocol (three-pass). The encrypted 10MB are incorporated in the last message
of each protocol. From the three cases, one-pass symmetric encryption has the
best performance. The simulation results are summarized in Table 1.
5. Discussion and Opportunistic Key Management
In DTNs a direct path between the source and destination does not always
exist. Such a constraint makes routing in delay tolerant networks opportunistic.
The main idea is that a custodian node will forward the data when there is an
available path. The same idea can be adopted for key management, as a way
to minimise the impact of such limitations of communication channel. Nodes
that do not have access to security credentials could run key exchange proto-
cols when the path is available and before the credentials are actually needed.
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Therefore the node will store locally some session keys for future use. However,
the best number of stored session keys depends on the available bandwidth, on
the connectivity, on node storage availability and other policy specific security
requirements that may be applicable.
Another usage of opportunistic key management could be opportunistic key
confirmation. A plethora of key exchange protocols such as MQV, KEA etc.
have 2-passes for key exchange and one more for key confirmation. Consider
for instance a security-source node that does not have any stored session key
and wishes to send encrypted data. In such case a key exchange protocol must
run first. In order to minimize the imposed delay by the three passes, the node
can initiate the first two passes for a key exchange and later when there is an
opportunity it can send the key confirmation.
6. Concluding remarks, open research challenges and future work
In this paper we proposed a method for practically evaluating key exchange
protocols in networks of adverse cation conditions. Our tool is designed to
accommodate a plethora of interactive protocols for key exchange and/or key
establishment. The proposed tool was realized in the form of a protocol parser
that can be used either as a decision making tool running on a DTN node
or a method for protocol evaluation in DTN environments. We confirmed for
example that a node lacking availability of a certain cryptographic credential
could be a prohibitive state in such networks. On this end, we introduced the
concept of opportunistic key management, where such problem is minimized.
Future development of the parser and the simulation tools will involve pro-
viding the DTN layer with greater visibility into the details of the simulated
security protocols thus enabling the implementation of more complex scenar-
ios. Specifically, the protocol language will be enriched with a “cryptographic
delay per byte of information” parameter, which will be passed on to the DTN
agent. Data corresponding to actual user payload, as opposed to key exchange
protocol messages, will be encrypted or decrypted at the DTN layer, inducing
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delay proportional to their size. In a simple scenario, application data will be
encrypted at the originating node, or upon entering an untrusted network seg-
ment, and decrypted at the final destination. In the general case, a bundle may
be encrypted/decrypted an arbitrary number of times when traversing different
security domains throughout the network.
The enhancements mentioned above will enable evaluation of scenarios that
build on scenario 4 of Section 4. Cryptographic delay of the payload will be
combined with the delay introduced by the key exchange phase, highlighting
the trade-off between the key exchange and the data transmission delay for
different protocols and payload sizes. An example of such a trade-off is using
computationally expensive public key cryptography while avoiding the key setup
phase, versus employing more efficient symmetric algorithms that require key
setup. Another example may involve the use of known keys for bundle decryp-
tion and re-encryption at intermediate, security domain gateway nodes, versus
negotiating new end-to-end keys.
Adverse networking conditions, such as long delays and intermittent connec-
tivity, make routing in DTNs a complex problem that heavily depends on the
idiosyncrasy of each network setting. Security considerations render this prob-
lem even more challenging. Secure communication does not exclusively depend
on contact opportunities, as in Contact Graph Routing [24], but also on key
state information and key exchange protocol characteristics. Our work aims at
gaining insight into the security aspects of DTN routing, in order to allow for
educated, security-aware routing decisions, based on security-oriented network
metrics.
References
[1] L. Wood, W. Eddy, P. Holiday, A bundle of problems, in: Aerospace con-
ference, 2009, pp. 1–14.
[2] S. Farrell, S. Symington, H. Weiss, P. Lovell, Delay-tolerant networking
13
security overview draft-irtf-dtnrg-sec-overview-06, internet-draft (2009).
URL http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-dtnrg-sec-overview-06
[3] S. Symington, S. Farrell, H. Weiss, P. Lovell, Bundle security protocol
specification, Rfc6257 (2011).
URL http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6257
[4] S. Birrane, Streamlined bundle security protocol specification draft-irtf-
dtnrg-sbsp-00, internet-draft (2013).
URL http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-dtnrg-sbsp-00
[5] S. Burleigh, Dtn security key management - requirements and design draft-
templin-dtnskmreq-00, internet-draft (2015).
URL https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-templin-dtnskmreq-00
[6] A. Seth, S. Keshav, Practical security for disconnected nodes, in: Proceed-
ings of the First International Conference on Secure Network Protocols,
NPSEC’05, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2005, pp. 31–
36.
URL http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1897159.1897165
[7] N. Asokan, K. Kostiainen, P. Ginzboorg, J. Ott, C. Luo, Applicability of
identity-based cryptography for disruption-tolerant networking, in: Pro-
ceedings of the 1st International MobiSys Workshop on Mobile Oppor-
tunistic Networking, MobiOpp ’07, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2007, pp.
52–56. doi:10.1145/1247694.1247705.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1247694.1247705
[8] A. Kate, G. M. Zaverucha, U. Hengartner, Anonymity and security in delay
tolerant networks, in: SecureComm, 2007, pp. 504–513.
[9] X. Lv, Y. Mu, H. Li, Non-interactive key establishment for bundle security
protocol of space dtns, Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transac-
tions on 9 (1) (2014) 5–13. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2013.2289993.
14
[10] P. Edelman, M. Donahoo, D. Sturgill, Secure group communications for
delay-tolerant networks, in: Internet Technology and Secured Transactions
(ICITST), 2010 International Conference for, 2010, pp. 1–8.
[11] G. Xu, X. Chen, X. Du, Chinese remainder theorem based dtn group key
management, in: Communication Technology (ICCT), 2012 IEEE 14th
International Conference on, 2012, pp. 779–783. doi:10.1109/ICCT.2012.
6511309.
[12] J. Zhou, M. Song, J. Song, X.-w. Zhou, L. Sun, Autonomic group key
management in deep space dtn, Wireless Personal Communications (2013)
1–19doi:10.1007/s11277-013-1505-1.
[13] W. L. Van Besien, Dynamic, non-interactive key management for the bun-
dle protocol, in: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Workshop on Challenged
Networks, CHANTS ’10, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2010, pp. 75–78.
doi:10.1145/1859934.1859951.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1859934.1859951
[14] Z. Jia, X. Lin, S.-H. Tan, L. Li, Y. Yang, Public key distribution scheme
for delay tolerant networks based on two-channel cryptography, J. Netw.
Comput. Appl. 35 (3) (2012) 905–913. doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2011.03.
009.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2011.03.009
[15] S. Menesidou, V. Katos, Authenticated key exchange (ake) in delay tolerant
networks, in: D. Gritzalis, S. Furnell, M. Theoharidou (Eds.), Information
Security and Privacy Research, Vol. 376 of IFIP Advances in Information
and Communication Technology, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 49–
60. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-30436-1_5.
[16] A. Shikfa, M. O¨nen, R. Molva, Local key management in opportunistic
networks, Int. J. Commun. Netw. Distrib. Syst. 9 (1/2) (2012) 97–116.
doi:10.1504/IJCNDS.2012.047898.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJCNDS.2012.047898
15
[17] Y. Ding, X.-w. Zhou, Z.-m. Cheng, W.-l. Zeng, Efficient authentication
and key agreement protocol with anonymity for delay tolerant networks,
Wireless Personal Communications 70 (4) (2013) 1473–1485. doi:10.1007/
s11277-012-0760-x.
[18] S. A. Camtepe, B. Yener, Key distribution mechanisms for wireless sensor
networks: a survey, Tech. rep. (2005).
[19] R. Na, Y. Ren, Y. Hori, K. Sakurai, A generic evaluation method for key
management schemes in wireless sensor network, in: Proceedings of the
5th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and
Communication, ICUIMC ’11, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2011, pp. 55:1–
55:9. doi:10.1145/1968613.1968680.
URL http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1968613.1968680
[20] B. Blanchet, Security protocol verification: Symbolic and computational
models, in: P. Degano, J. Guttman (Eds.), Principles of Security and
Trust, Vol. 7215 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Berlin
Heidelberg, 2012, pp. 3–29.
[21] Pyparsing wiki home [online, cited 2015-03-18].
[22] Dtn agent for ns-2 [online, cited 2015-03-18].
[23] N. Bezirgiannidis, V. Tsaoussidis, Packet size and dtn transport service:
Evaluation on a dtn testbed, in: Ultra Modern Telecommunications and
Control Systems and Workshops (ICUMT), 2010 International Congress
on, 2010, pp. 1198–1205.
[24] S. Burleigh, Contact graph routing draft-burleigh-dtnrg-cgr-01, internet-
draft (2010).
URL http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-burleigh-dtnrg-cgr-00
16
Table 1: Protocol Language
Function Explanation Usage Example
exp(x,y,p) Exponentiation exp(x,y,10)
xˆy mod p
hash(name,data) Hash function hash(SHA1,10)
name is {SHA1,SHA256,SHA512,MD5}
es(data,name,key) Symmetric Encryption es(10,AES,K)
name is {AES,DES,TripleDES}
key is the symmetric key
ea(data,name,key) Asymmetric Encryption ea(10,RSA,PubB)
name is {RSA,ElGamal}
key is the symmetric key
xor(data,data) Exclusive OR xor(10,15)
symkey(key,data) Symmetric Key symkey(K,10)
key is the symmetric key
privkey(key,data) Private Key privkey(PrivA,10)
key is the private key
pubkey(key,data) Public Key pubkey(PrivA,10)
key is the public key
cert(nn,data) Certificate cert(A,4)
nn is node name
keymaterial(material,data,key) Key material keymaterial(gˆra,10,K)
material is used to create session key
key is the session key
sig(data,key) Signature sig(10,PrivA)
key is the private key
id(nn,data) Node identity id(A,4)
nn is node name
mac(hash,key) MAC mac(hash(SHA1,10),K)
hash is the returned value of hash function
key is the session key
tstamp(data) Timestamp tstamp(4)
nonce(data) Nonce nonce(4)
plaintext(data) Plaintext plaintext(10)
mod(x,p) Modulo mod(x,10)
x mod p
data: is the input length in bytes
17
Table 2: Node Language
Function Explanation Usage Example
symkey=key key is the symmetric key symkey=K
privkey=key key is the private key privkey=PrivA
pubkey=key key is the public key pubkey=PubA
cert=key key is the certificate cert=A
connkey=privkey:pubkey connection between private and public key conn key=PrivA:PubA
Figure 1: Procedure methodology
Table 3: Scenario 3
Protocol Parser Input
Case 1
Protocol Language A→B:es(1024,AES,K)
Node Language A:
E:symkey=K
Path Language A[0.05Mb,0.0001Mb]D[0.1Mb,0.0002Mb]E
Case 1 - after injection
Protocol Language A→KDC:plaintext(1)
KDC→A:symkey(K,16)
A→B:es(1024,AES,K)
Node Language A:
E:symkey=K
KDC:symkey=K
Path Language A[0.05Mb,0.0001Mb]D[0.1Mb,0.0002Mb]E
A[0.1Mb,0.0002Mb]KDC
Case 2
Protocol Language A→B:plaintext(1024)
Node Language A:
E:
Path Language A[0.05Mb,0.0001Mb]B[0.1Mb,0.0002Mb]C[0.1Mb,0.0002Mb]E
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Table 4: End-to-end delay results
case 1 case 2 case 3
Scenario 1 HMP HMP without public key -
1801.7264 sec 5528.256 sec -
Scenario 2 HMP KEA/UM/MQV STS
1801.7264 sec 3726.52959 sec 5745.0528 sec
Scenario 3 Symmetric Encryption Plaintext -
7331.7088 sec 5406.9054 sec -
Scenario 4 RSA HMP/AES STS/AES
2422328.8256 sec 2214639.2096 sec 2218567.8096 sec
Figure 2: Scenario 1
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Figure 3: Scenario 3
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